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Spinoza on Causa Sui
YITZHAK Y. MELAMED
The very first line of  Spinoza’s magnum opus, the Ethics, states the following surprising 
definition:
By cause of  itself  I understand that whose essence involves existence, or that whose nature 
cannot be conceived except as existing [Per causam sui intelligo id, cujus essentia involvit existen-
tiam, sive id, cujus natura non potest concipi, nisi existens].
As we shall shortly see, for many of  Spinoza’s contemporaries and predecessors the very 
notion of  causa sui was utterly absurd, akin to a Baron Munchausen attempting to lift himself  
above a river by pulling his hair up. How can a thing cause itself  into existence, if  before the 
causal activity, the cause did not exist at all? Indeed, in one of  his earliest works, Spinoza him-
self  claimed: “No thing, considered in itself, has in itself  a cause enabling it to destroy itself  (if  
it exists), or to make itself  [te konnen maaken] (if  it does not exist)” (KV II 26|I/110/14–16). 
Moreover, in other early works, Spinoza refers to God as an “uncreated thing” (TIE §97) or 
“uncreated substance” (CM II 1|I/237/20), and not as a cause‐of‐itself  as in the Ethics. What 
made Spinoza desert the common, traditional, view of  God as the uncaused first cause, or 
uncreated substance, and adopt instead the apparently chimerical notion of  God as causa sui?
A very likely explanation for this development suggests that Spinoza’s rationalism, his 
commitment to the principle that everything must have a reason both for its existence and 
for its non‐existence – a commitment stated clearly both in the Ethics (see, for example, 
E1p8s2 and E1p11d2), and in Spinoza’s other writings (see, for example, Ep.  34 
(IV/179/29)) – made him realize that the notion of  an uncreated, or uncaused, thing is of  
no use for him: if  everything must have a cause, then the first cause, or the most fundamental 
being, must be a cause‐of‐itself.
All this is well and good, but we should not let Spinoza off  the hook so easily, for the 
immediate question which arises now is whether Spinoza is not simply cheating his 
readers. Does Spinoza have a reason – i.e. argument – that could convince us that causa sui 
is indeed a more adequate characterization of  God and not merely an opportunistic and ad 
hoc façade for the good old uncaused cause? While there are many important questions 
surrounding Spinoza’s notion of  causa sui, it is the last question which will be the focus of  
this short chapter.
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In the first part of  this chapter, I study, briefly, Descartes’ engagement with the notion of  
causa sui. In the second part, I show that Spinoza understood the causation of  causa sui as 
efficient, and not formal, causation. The third and final part will attempt to locate precisely 
the alleged problem with the notion of  causa sui, and consider how could Spinoza defend 
the intelligibility of  this notion. Regrettably, limitations of  space will force us to leave the 
examination of  Spinoza’s closely related notion of  being‐conceived–through‐itself  [per se 
concipitur] for another occasion (cf. Melamed and Lin 2018, pp. 11–13).
1. Causa sui in Descartes
Proving the existence of  God was the stated aim of  Descartes’ Third Meditation (AT VII 
14| CSM II 10). In the course of  developing his proof, Descartes noted that whatever 
“derives its existence from oneself  [a se].  .  . is itself  God [illam ipsam Deum esse]” (AT VII 
49–50| CSM II 34). Addressing this claim, Johannes Caterus, a Dutch theologian and the 
author of  the First Set of  Objections appended to the Meditations, asked Descartes whether 
by describing God’s existence as being “from itself ” he used the expression as “everyone 
takes the phrase,” namely, as merely indicating that God is not caused by another, or 
whether, alternatively, Descartes positively meant that God is its own cause, and thus 
“bestows its own existence upon itself ” (AT VII 95| CSM II 68. Cf. Douglas 2015, 
pp. 75–78). Caterus continued his critique by arguing that the traditional, negative sense 
of  being “from itself ” is ill‐fitted for yielding the conclusion Descartes attempted to derive. 
Caterus did not elaborate on the alternative, positive sense of  the phrase, as he apparently 
considered it absurd, and thus wished to avoid ascribing it to Descartes. But here awaited 
him a surprise.
Responding to Caterus’ query Descartes writes:
I did not say that it was impossible for something to be the efficient cause of  itself. This is obvi-
ously the case when the term ‘efficient’ is taken to apply only to causes which are prior in time 
to their effects, or different from them. But such a restriction does not seem appropriate in the 
present context. First, it would make the question trivial, since everyone knows that something 
cannot be prior to, or distinct from, itself. Second, the natural light does not establish that the 
concept of  an efficient cause requires that it be prior in time to its effect. On the contrary, the 
concept of  a cause is, strictly speaking, applicable only for as long as the cause is producing 
[producit] its effect, and so it is not prior to it. However, the light of  nature does establish that if  
anything exists we may always ask why it exists; that is, we may inquire into its efficient cause, 
or, if  it does not have one, we may demand why it does not need one. (AT VII 108| CSM II 78; 
italics added)
Descartes’ response to Caterus is pretty simple: he denies that efficient causation must 
be spread in time. In fact, he argues, in its strict sense, efficient causation requires that the 
cause and its effect are concurrent. Thus, one major obstacle to the possibility of  efficient 
self‐causation seems to be removed. At this point, Descartes is ready to launch a counter‐
attack on those who deny the possibility of  self‐causation.
Hence, if  I thought that nothing could possibly have the same relation to itself  as an efficient 
cause has to its effect, I should certainly not conclude that there was a first cause. On the con-
trary, I should go on to ask for the cause of  the so‐called ‘first’ cause, and thus I would never reach 
anything which was the first cause of  everything else. However, I do readily admit that there can 
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exist something which possesses such great and inexhaustible power that it never required the 
assistance of  anything else in order to exist in the first place, and does not now require any 
assistance for its preservation, so that it is, in a certain way, its own cause; and I understand God to 
be such a being. (AT VII 108–9| CSM II 78; italics added)
If  I understand the first two sentences of  this last passage correctly, Descartes asserts 
here that the only alternative to self‐causation is an infinite regression of  causes. The 
possibility that God, qua first cause, simply has no cause is not considered a viable option 
in this passage, apparently, because it would constitute a blatant violation of  the ex nihilo 
nihil fit principle which Descartes clearly endorsed (see, for example, AT VI 34| CSM 128 
and AT VII 135| CSM II 297). True, even in this passage we sense a certain hesitation on 
Descartes’ side as he qualifies the claim that God is its own (efficient) cause by the 
modifier: “in a certain way [quodammodo].” Still, we should take notice that in this 
passage God is not described as having no cause, but rather it is God’s inexhaustible 
power – a causal faculty – which explains why God needs no other assistance, or cause, 
for its existence.
This state of  things seems to change slightly in the axiomatic excerpt which appears at 
the very end of  the Second Set of  Replies. Here, Descartes posits the following axiom:
Concerning every existing thing it is possible to ask what is the cause of  its existence. This 
question may even be asked concerning God, not because he needs any cause in order to exist, 
but because the immensity of  his nature is the cause or reason [ipsa ejus naturae immensitas est 
causa sive ratio] why he needs no cause in order to exist. (AT VII 165| CSM II 116)
There are three tiny but still noteworthy differences between the last two excerpts. (1) 
The First Replies excerpt suggests that God’s inexhaustible power explains why he does 
not need the assistance of  (another) cause. In the Second Replies excerpt, it is God’s 
immense nature which provides the explanation. In his correspondence, Descartes sug-
gests that God’s power and essence are not distinct (AT V 342| CSM III 372). Thus, 
this first difference seems a mere nuance. (2) In the First Replies excerpt, God is said to 
need no “assistance,” i.e. an external cause, in order to exist. In the Second Replies, God 
is said to need “no cause,” with no further qualification that the cause in question is an 
external cause. (3) In the First Replies excerpt, God’s power seems to be the cause that 
makes the assistance of  another cause redundant. In the Second Replies, God’s nature 
is the “cause or reason” why he needs no cause. In the Second Set of  Replies, Descartes 
seems to be trying to somewhat play down the claim that God is its own cause – or, to 
use his own admission in a closely related context, he has “deliberately altered [the 
formulation] so that I might suit a wide variety of  minds” (AT VII 120| CSM II 85). 
But was Descartes also truly withdrawing from the claim that God is its own efficient 
cause?
Descartes’ surprising response to Caterus drew the attention of  Antoine Arnauld, the 
author of  the Fourth Set of  Objections, and, at the time, a doctoral student of  theology at 
the Sorbonne. For Arnauld, any positive interpretation of  the claim that God derives its 
existence a se is simply absurd. It makes no sense to claim that God preserves itself, claims 
Arnauld, just as it makes no sense to claim that God creates itself  (AT VII 212| CSM II 
149). Things which require creation and preservation by an efficient cause are things 
whose existence is not guaranteed by their very essence (AT VII 213| CSM II 150). 
Responding to Descartes’ claim in the First Replies that if  we deny the possibility of  divine 
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self‐causation, we have no other resort but to accept an infinite regression of  causes, 
Arnauld writes:
Not at all. If  I thought we ought to look for the efficient cause, or quasi‐efficient cause, of  any 
given thing, then what I would be looking for would be a cause distinct from the thing in question, 
since it is completely evident to me that nothing can possibly stand in the same relation to itself  
as that in which an efficient cause stands to its effect. (AT VII 213–4| CSM II 150; italics added)
At first glance, Arnauld’s response to Descartes seems quite odd, as he appears not to 
address at all the threat – pointed out by Descartes – of  an infinite regression of  causes. But 
upon closer reading, it becomes evident that Arnauld is providing an interesting rebuttal. 
Were I to believe unrestrictedly that everything must have an efficient cause and thus 
follow an endless regression of  causes in an attempt to explain why something, or the 
world, exists – claims Arnauld – I would thereby show that I am not satisfied with an answer 
suggesting that the world is self‐caused (for if  I were satisfied with such an answer, I would 
not inquire about the world’s cause and the infinite causal regression would never get off  
the ground). But why would I not be satisfied with the suggested that the world is self‐
caused? Because “it is completely evident to me that nothing can possibly stand in the 
same relation to itself  as that which an efficient cause stands to its effects.” In other words, 
what Arnauld seems to be saying is that our standard practice of  looking for external effi-
cient causes indicates that we rule out the possibility of  self‐causation and consider it a 
clear absurdity.
Descartes addresses Arnauld’s objection in great detail in the Fourth Set of  Replies. Yet, 
as Tad Schmatz has recently argued, “Descartes was not entirely on top of  his game” in 
drafting his response (Schmaltz 2011, p. 113; for a different evaluation, see Marion 1991, 
pp. 427–244). Descartes begins by asserting that his claim in the First Replies that “‘God is 
in a sense his own cause’ cannot possibly be taken to mean an efficient cause” (AT VII 
236| CSM II 65). Against Arnauld, Descartes argues that if  we deny the universality of  the 
requirement to inquire about the efficient causes of  all things, we would block “the pri-
mary and principal way, if  not the only way, that we have of  proving the existence of  God” 
(AT VII 238| CSM II166). Thus, maintaining, like Arnauld, that God has “no cause at all” 
is not an option for Descartes (AT VII 239| CSM II 167). Instead, Descartes suggests the 
following observation:
Those who follow the sole guidance of  the natural light will in this context spontaneously 
form a concept of  cause that is common to both an efficient and a formal cause: that is to say, 
what derives its existence ‘from another’ will be taken to derive its existence from that thing as 
an efficient cause, while what derives its existence ‘from itself ’ will be taken to derive its existence 
from itself  as a formal cause – that is, because it has the kind of  essence which entails that it does not 
require an efficient cause. (AT VII 238| CSM II 166; italics added).
For Descartes, the proper cause of  essences is formal, not efficient (AT VII 243| CSM II 
169). As we shall shortly see, on this issue, Spinoza will develop a very different view. 
Descartes also stresses that describing God as an (efficient) ‘effect of  itself ’ is an indig-
nity to God, insofar as the effect of  an efficient cause is commonly regarded as inferior 
to the cause (AT VII 242| CSM II 169). Here too Spinoza will demur. Yet, despite all 
these pressures against the view of  God as an efficient causa sui, even in the Fourth 
Replies Descartes would not completely withdraw from this view, and instead insist 
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that since in God’s case, essence and existence are not distinct, God’s essence qua 
“formal cause will be strongly analogous to an efficient cause, and hence can be called 
something close to an efficient” (AT VII 243| CSM II 170). It is not completely clear to 
me why Descartes insists on defending a scaled‐down, analogical version, of  his claim 
that God is an efficient cause of  itself, especially given the fact that for the Scholastics 
this view was almost an anathema (Aquinas  1975, Summa contra gentiles, I 13 iv; 
Aquinas 1964, Summa Theologiae, I 2 iii; Anselm 1998, Monologion, Ch. 6, p. 18); cf. 
Carraud, 2002, p. 267 and Lee, 2006, pp. 93–109). Perhaps it was the threat posed to 
the possibility of  proving God’s existence, once the universality of  the demand for 
explanation through efficient causes is revoked, that made Descartes dig in his heels 
and insist that there is still a sense – analogical and non‐literal as it is – in which even 
God has an efficient cause, or – if  we adhere to Descartes’ formulation – God is its own 
efficient cause.
2. Spinoza’s Causa (efficiens) sui
The young Spinoza must have watched Descartes’ struggle with the notion of  causa sui 
with great interest. We know for a fact that Spinoza read the Objection and Replies quite 
carefully, as he frequently cites them in his own works (see, for example, DPP1p5s, and KV 
I, vii| I/I/47/10; cf. Kambouchner 2021). We have already seen that in his early Treatise 
on the Emendation of  the Intellect (§97), and the Cogitata Metaphysica (I/237/20), Spinoza 
was not yet ready to introduce the notion of  causa sui. Instead, he would refer to God as an 
uncreated thing, or uncreated substance. One passage in the TIE comes close to endorsing 
the notion of  causa sui: “that Thought is also called true which involves objectively the 
essence of  some principle that does not have a cause, and is known through itself  and in itself 
[per se, & in se cognoscitur]” (TIE §70; italics added). Here, the said principle has no cause, 
yet it is known through itself. The Cogitata Metaphysica – an early text of  Spinoza that may or 
may not represent his own views at the time – also rejects the notion of  divine, continuous 
self‐creation (CM II 1| I/250/25).
In the Short Treatise, the notion of  causa sui already appears explicitly in the text, though 
in a relatively marginal note. In this context, Spinoza does not miss the opportunity to 
scold Aquinas for holding that God has no cause.
But God, the first cause of  all things, and also the cause of  himself [de oorzaak syns zelfs], makes 
himself  known through himself. So what Thomas Aquinas says – that God could not be proved 
a priori, because he supposedly has no cause – is not of  much importance. (KV I 1| I/18/25; 
italics added)
A further development occurs in a text commonly referred to as the first appendix to the 
Short Treatise, though if  my argument elsewhere (Melamed 2019) is correct, this excerpt is 
in fact the earliest draft of  the Ethics we currently have. In this text, causa sui appears as a 
key concept in the sixth axiom of  this excerpt: “What is a cause of  itself  [een oorzaak van zig 
zelfs] could not possibly have limited itself ” (I/114/19).
The Ethics opens with the definition of  causa sui (E1d1) in a manner that seems 
almost nonchalant. What kind of  causation is the causation of  causa sui (in the Ethics)? 
In a recent important work, Vincent Carraud argued that Spinoza’s causa sui should be 
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read along Cartesian lines, and that it is “much closer to the formal cause than the 
Cartesian efficient cause” (Carraud  2002, p.  324). Moreover, Carraud argues that, 
since for Spinoza God’s self‐activity is the paradigm of  all causation (Carraud  2002, 
p.  313), Spinoza’s causes, in general, should be read as formal rather than efficient 
causes. With regard to both claims I beg to differ. We do not have the space here to dis-
cuss the general nature of  causation in the Ethics, but let me make three brief  observa-
tions. (1) The term ‘causa formalis’ is virtually absent in the Ethics: it appears only once 
(E5p31), apparently as an analogy (“tanquam à formali causâ”), and not in a very 
central place. (2) Throughout the Ethics, Spinoza uses ‘causa’ as interchangeable with 
‘producing [producere]’. The terminology of  production is tightly associated with effi-
cient causation in both medieval and early modern philosophy (see Schmid 2015). (3) 
The terms ‘causa efficiens,’ ‘causa immanens,’ and ‘causa transiens’ are very common in 
the Ethics. Spinoza introduces the latter two terms in E1p18, and the reliance of  E1p18d 
on E1p16c1, makes clear that the dichotomy between immanent and transient causa-
tion is a bifurcation between two sub‐species of  the efficient cause: an immanent cause 
is an efficient cause whose effect inheres in the cause, while a transient cause is a cause 
whose effect does not inhere in the cause (see Melamed 2013, pp. 61–66, for detailed 
discussion). In the Short Treatise, Spinoza presents explicitly the distinction between 
immanent and transient causation as a distinction within the efficient cause (KV I 7| 
I/35/20). For all these reasons, I think the case for reading Spinoza’s concept of  cause, 
in general, as formal, rather than efficient, is not strong. Still, I believe Carraud put his 
finger on an important issue in Spinoza’s understanding of  causation, namely, that 
Spinoza extends significantly the traditional functions of  the efficient cause and assigns 
to the efficient cause functions which his predecessors would ascribe to the other 
Aristotelian causes.
Surprising as it may seem to some, I also believe that Spinoza is committed to the view 
that God is the efficient cause of  itself, i.e. that the causation of  the causa sui is efficient. In 
this sense, one can observe some continuity between Spinoza’s and Descartes’ discussions 
of  causa sui, though, unlike Descartes, Spinoza is much more resolute and unapologetic in 
employing this crucial notion. Here is, very briefly, the main textual evidence supporting 
this conclusion.
(1) In E1p6c, Spinoza proves that “a substance cannot be produced by anything else 
[substantiam ab alio produci non posse]” The terminology of  ‘producere’ is a clear indication 
that the causation at stake in E1p6c is efficient. In E1p7, Spinoza relies on E1p6c and on a 
tacit premise that everything must have a cause in order to infer that a substance must be 
a cause of  itself, and thus (per E1d1) have essence involving existence. Now, suppose the 
tacit premise were not restricted to efficient causation, i.e. that it only required that every-
thing must have a cause, either efficient or not. In such a case, the argument of  E1p7d 
would be invalid: not being efficiently caused by anything else, a substance could still have 
a cause without being causa sui, by being non‐efficiently caused by another. Thus, in order 
to be valid, the tacit premise must strictly require that everything must have an efficient 
cause. But this strict version of  the tacit premise yields the conclusion that substance is an 
efficient cause of  itself.
(2) E1p16 is probably the most central juncture of  the Ethics. The proposition reads,
From the necessity of  the divine nature there must follow infinitely many things in infinitely 
many modes (i.e. everything which can fall under an infinite intellect).
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Relying on this proposition Spinoza infers the following corollary:
From this it follows that God is the efficient cause of  all things [omnium rerum] which can fall 
under an infinite intellect. (E1p16c1; italics added)
For Spinoza, God itself  is a thing [res] (see, for example, E2a1), and this infinite thing is 
known by God’s intellect (per E2p3d and E2p4). Thus, from E1p16c1, we can immediately 
infer that God is also the efficient cause of  itself  (insofar as God actually “falls under an 
infinite intellect”).
(3) In Ep. 60 (dated January 1675), Spinoza explains why he does not employ in the 
Ethics the common definition of  God as ens pefectissimum. A proper definition of  a thing, 
claims Spinoza, should “express the efficient cause” of  the thing (IV/270/23; italics added; 
cf. TIE §96). However, Spinoza notes, “when I define God as a supremely perfect being [ens 
summè perfectum] . . . that definition does not express the efficient cause (for I understand 
the efficient cause to be both internal and external).” Unlike those who consider all effi-
cient causes as external, Spinoza stresses that an efficient cause might well be internal (or 
immanent) (see E1p18d, KV II 2|I/35/12–20, and KV II 26| I/110/23). Spinoza is clearly 
well aware of  the fact that many (though not all) of  his predecessors would reject the pos-
sibility of  an internal efficient cause (see KV I 2| I/30/22–25). By allowing efficient causes 
to be also internal, Spinoza opens the path for the possibility that even God – outside of  
which there is nothing (E1p15) – has an efficient cause. Indeed, in the last quote from 
Ep. 60, Spinoza insists that even in the case of  God, the proper definition (of  God) must refer 
to the efficient cause (of  the thing defined), from which one can clearly infer that God has 
an efficient cause (though, an internal efficient cause). Now, the efficient cause of  God, 
cannot be anything other than God itself, for if  the efficient cause were anything but God, 
God would have to be conceived through that cause (per E1a4), and thus God would be 
conceptually posterior to its cause which would contradict the definition of  God as sub-
stance (E1d6).
(4) In Ep. 34 (dated January 1666), Spinoza presents his standard and fundamental 
distinction between the ground of  the existence of  God, or the substance, and the 
grounds for the existence of  things which can be “many in number.” God exists solely by 
virtue of  its essence while all things which can be many in number exist by virtue of  
causes that are distinct from the things themselves. In this context, Spinoza tellingly 
characterizes existence‐by‐virtue‐of‐mere‐essence as “being produced by the force of  its 
own nature [suae naturae vi produci]” (IV/180/21; italics added). As we mentioned before, 
the terminology of  production is a clear mark of  efficient causation. Spinoza’s 
employment of  the terminology of  production to describe existing by virtue of  one’s own 
essence alone seems to indicate that, for Spinoza, existence by virtue of  essence is a case 
of  efficient causation.
(5) In E1p25 Spinoza proves that God is also the efficient cause of  the essence of  things 
(recall that for Descartes (AT VII 243| CSM II 169), causation of  essence belongs to formal 
causation). This intriguing proposition and its demonstration read:
E1p25: God is the efficient cause, not only of  the existence of  things [rerum], but also of  their essence.
Dem.: If  you deny this, then God is not the cause of  the essence of  things; and so (by A4) the 
essence of  things can be conceived without God. But (by P15) this is absurd. Therefore, God is 
also the cause of  the essence of  things, q.e.d.
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Now, let us ask: what is the scope of  ‘rerum’ in E1p25? Is God the efficient cause of  his own 
essence? If  we follow the argument of  E1p25d, God must be the efficient cause of  his own 
essence. For otherwise, God’s essence could be conceived without God which would flatly 
contradict E1p15.
The four texts we have discussed so far establish, I believe, that Spinoza was happy to 
affirm that God is the efficient cause of  itself. Still, how would he respond to the powerful 
arguments against the intelligibility of  this notion?
3. Defending Causa (efficiens) sui
Let us begin by considering two arguments which appear explicitly in the exchanges bet-
ween Descartes, Caterus, and Arnauld. Then we will consider two additional arguments 
against the intelligibility of  efficient self‐causation.
(1) Must efficient causation be spread out in time? – Just like Descartes, Spinoza allows 
for efficient causation which is unmistakably not spread in time. Of  such a kind is the 
causation of  essences (E1p25), the causation of  infinite modes (E1pp21–23; cf. 
Melamed  2013, pp.  122–126), the flow of  natura naturata from natura naturans (see 
E1p29s: natura naturata is caused by, but is not after, natura naturans), as well as the flow 
of  duration from eternity (Ep. 12. IV/57/17). In short, immanent causation is not spread 
in time (Melamed 2013, p. 111). If  an efficient cause need not be temporally prior to its 
effect, then one major obstacle to the possibility of  self‐causation (and reciprocal causa-
tion) is removed.
(2) Is it proper for God to be an effect of  itself? – In his response to Arnauld, Descartes 
admits that he hesitates to call God ‘cause of  itself ’ in order “not to imply that he has any of  
the indignity of  being an effect” (AT VII 242| CSM II 168–169). Spinoza, however, should 
not be moved much by such considerations as he openly speaks of  “God insofar as it is mod-
ified by a modification which is finite” (E1p28d), and thus, as a recipient of  an action. 
Moreover, in E1p15s, Spinoza notes that even if  extension were divisible, he would still 
assert that extension is one of  God’s attributes since there is nothing “unworthy [indignam 
esse]” in God being acted on by itself (II/60/13–15).
(3) Is it Contradictory to be both the Cause and Effect of  Itself ? – In his Summa Contra 
Gentiles, Aquinas – echoing Aristotle – presents the following argument against the 
view of  God as causing, or moving, itself: “The same thing cannot be at once in act 
and in potency with respect to the same thing. But everything that is moved is, as 
such, in potency, .  .  .[while] that which moves is, as such, in act” (Aquinas  1975, 
p. 88; Summa contra gentiles, I 13 iv. Descartes might be alluding to this argument in 
AT VII 240| CSM II 168). For the Aristotelians, causation is a movement from poten-
tiality to actuality. From this perspective, causa sui seems to be a state in which a thing 
is and is not actual, at the same time, and in the same respect (Lee 2006, p. 98). This 
argument too seems to be ineffective against Spinoza’s notion of  causa sui for two rea-
sons. First, as we have seen before, Spinoza would deny that efficient causation 
requires time. But since movement and change presuppose time, efficient causation 
need not involve either change or movement. Second, Spinoza dispenses with the 
Aristotelian notion of  potentiality (see E1p17s| II/62/19–20), and thereby also 
rejects the Aristotelian view of  causation as movement from potentiality to 
actuality.
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(4) Can God be less Perfect than Itself? – In the course of  his discussion of  teleology in 
E1app, Spinoza presents the following claim regarding the infinite modes (discussed in 
E1pp21–23): “that effect is most perfect which is produced immediately by God, and the 
more something requires intermediate causes to produce it, the more imperfect it is” 
(E1app| II/80/16–18). In other words, infinite modes which inhere immediately in God are 
more perfect (whatever perfection here means) than infinite modes which inhere in God 
through the mediation of  other infinite modes (see E1p22.=; cf. Melamed 2013, pp. 12–1). 
Now, this might give one the impression that Spinoza is committed to the view that an 
effect of  an immanent cause must be less real than its cause. But if  God is the immanent 
efficient cause of  itself, we would have to conclude that God is less real than itself, which is 
absurd.
The fallacy in the last argument lies in the assumption that an effect of  an immanent 
cause is always less real than its cause. For Spinoza, a mode is less perfect, or less real, than 
its substance precisely because it is in‐another, and depends on another for its being. 
Substance which is only in‐itself  and is immanently caused only by itself  is maximally real 
since it is maximally independent. In other words, it is only inherence in another (but not 
inherence it itself) that creates the gap of  perfection or reality. This point is confirmed by 
the very sentence by which we begun the current discussion: “and the more something 
requires intermediate causes to produce it, the more imperfect it is.” In the limit case, 
where there are no intermediaries and the effect is not at all distinct from the cause, there 
is no difference in perfection.
4. Conclusion
In this chapter we have studied Spinoza’s extraordinary notion of  causa sui and the 
Cartesian background of  this discussion. I have argued that, unlike Descartes, Spinoza was 
unapologetic in his willingness to defend the notion of  God being the efficient cause of  
itself. The introduction of  causa immanens and the view of  the causation of  essences as 
belonging to efficient causation created the conceptual space required for sustaining the 
notion of  causa efficiens sui. We have also discussed five powerful objections to the intelligi-
bility of  causa sui – three by Spinoza’s predecessors and two internal to his system. For all I 
can tell, none of  these objections is conclusive and most do not create a major dent in 
Spinoza’s defense.
This of  course does not mean that the notion of  causa sui is immune from problems or 
even free from inconsistency. Rigid proofs of  consistency of  philosophical concepts are 
extremely difficult (and extremely rare in philosophy) and I have not even tried the first 
steps on this path. One may perhaps suggest that reflexive efficient causation is just intui-
tively wrong. But the weight of  such an argument would depend much on one’s valuation 
of  intuitions. On my side, I can only note that for the medieval and early modern philoso-
phers it was absolutely intuitively clear that parthood is an irreflexive relation (“the whole 
is great than its part” has been used as stock example of  an eternal truth). Alas, contem-
porary mereology allows for reflexive parthood. Thus, my intuition about the reflexivity, or 
irreflexivity, of  a specific relation, may indicate nothing over and above uncritical habit of  
thinking.
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There may well be strong and cogent arguments against efficient self‐causation, but it is 
now time for them to be stated explicitly and scrutinized. To use the words of  Yonah 
Wallach (1944–1985), an exceptional Israeli woman poet:
We are told that there is another kind of  sex
It’s good that someone knows about it
If  there is another kind of  sex – bring it out unto us
And let us know it.
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